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"Knock, Knock" Is No Joke: Announcement Rules for Business Premises
Knock and announce' requirements significantly restrict police
ability to enter private premises. 2 Applicable in both search and arrest contexts, 3 announcement rules require police officers to gain the
occupants' 4 attention and to identify their authority and purpose
prior to forcibly 5 entering private premises. If an occupant denies
police access or fails to respond within a reasonable time, 6 police
may use reasonably necessary force to enter and effect a lawful
search or arrest. 7 Evidence obtained in violation of announcement
rules will be excluded from any subsequent trial.8
1. "Knock and announce" is a common term describing the requirement that police officers give notice of their identity and purpose before entering private premises. In this Note,

"announcement" and "notice" connote satisfaction of both requirements.

2. Most jurisdictions have statutes prescribing announcement prior to forcible police entries. See Comment, The Conceptof "Breaking"in,4nnouncement Statutes, 7 LoY. L.A. L. RPEv.

162, 162 n.3 (1974) (listing 32 state statutes) [hereinafter cited as LOYOLA COMMENT]. Typical
is the federal statute, which provides:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a
-house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and
purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding
him in the execution of the warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as § 3109].
Announcement is also required by the fourth amendment. See notes 54-59 infra and accompanying text.
3. Although the federal statute, see note 2 supra, expressly applies only to the execution of
search warrants, announcement requirements extend to arrest entries. See notes 47-48 infra
and accompanying text. Many states have separate statutes addressing arrest and search entries. For an extensive review of arrest and search announcement requirements in the states,
see Sonnenreich & Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An Alleged ConstitutionalProblem, 44 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 626, 654 app. (1970).
4. This Note is concerned solely with the announcement required prior to entry of occupied
private premises. It appears settled that unannounced entry may be made of unoccupied
premises. See Payne v. United States, 508 F.2d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933
(1975); United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40, 43-44 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864
(1973).
Business premises are, of course, less likely to be occupied at certain times. But the erroneous belief, however reasonable, that the building to be searched is unoccupied does not justify
dispensing with announcement. If the building is unoccupied, the government loses nothing
by announcement; if it is occupied, their unannounced entry clearly implicates all the interests
the notice requirement protects. See Gervato, 474 F.2d at 44 (no § 3109 issue where officers did
knock and announce prior to search of building they believed to be unoccupied).
5. Announcement requirements apply in certain circumstances even absent "force" or a
literal "breaking." See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968) (holding unlawful an
unannounced entry through a closed but unlocked door). For a thorough examination of the
"breaking" concept, see LOYoLA COMMENT, supra note 2.
6. The amount of time considered reasonable is likely to vary according to the circumstances of each case. See 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE § 4.8(c) at 130 (1978).
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976) (quoted at note 2 supra).
8. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.

1666

June 1983]

Note -

Knock andAnnounce

1667

Announcement protection for private dwellings derives from two
independent sources. The federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3109,9 explicitly provides such protection. Courts have also recognized a fourth

amendment right to announcement protection.' 0 This Note addresses the question whether announcement rules apply when fed-

eral officers enter private business premises."
The federal courts have divided on the issue of extending full

announcement protection to business premises.' 2 Courts extending

301, 314 (1958); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (where officer had not
properly identified himself and his purpose, the occupant's flight was not sufficient to constitute probable cause; the arrest was thus illegal and its fruits had to be excluded).
9. The statute is set forth at note 2 supra.
10. See, eg., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38-41 (1963) (implying constitutional announcement protection); United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 9 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974);
United States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992, 1001 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971);
United States exrel. Ametrane v. Gable, 401 F.2d 765, 766 (3d Cir. 1968). For a description of
the origins of the constitutionally based announcement requirements, see note 54 infra
11. This Note treats federal announcement protection for businesses as required by § 3109
and the fourth amendment. Fourth amendment announcement requirements, of course, apply
equally to the states. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule
for illegal searches and seizures to the states).
Whether there is any difference between § 3109 and constitutional announcement requirements is debatable. See United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 1976) (§ 3109

"explicatels] fundamental purposes of the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Mapp, 476
F.2d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 1973) ("merger" of § 3109 and fourth amendment rules accomplished in
Sabbath, 391 U.S. at 591); Sonnenreich & Ebner, supra note 3, at 646 ("Both section 3109 and

the fourth amendment contemplate exceptions in exigent circumstances, but whether section
3109 is more stringent in application cannot yet be determined.").
Both fourth amendment and statutory announcement rules have common law origins. See
Semayne's Case, 5 Coke's Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603). For an excellent history of
the common law announcement rule, see Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful
Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 499, 500-08 (1964).
Section 3109 is universally regarded to have codified common law announcement rules. See,
e.g., Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589 (1968). Similarly, the fourth amendment rule
has grown out of the common law. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 49 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); note 56 infra. This historical background renders significant overlap between
§ 3109 and the fourth amendment inevitable.
Moreover, modem courts have incorporated a privacy element, which was not a basis for
common law announcement rules, into their discussions of § 3109's application. See, e.g.,
Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589-90 (1968); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301,
313 (1958); Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Blakey, supra, at
554; note 58 infra and accompanying text. Since the fourth amendment also serves to protect
privacy expectations, one can expect that, to the extent the rules continue to develop in the
courts, announcement requirements will have parallel evolutions under the statute and the
fourth amendment.
For purposes of this Note, it is not critical that any technical differences between the statutory and the fourth amendment rules be resolved. In the context of either rule, a distinction
between homes and businesses is unjustified.
12. Compare United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying § 3109
to police entry of business premises); United States v. Case, 435 F.2d 766, 770 n.1 (7th Cir.
1970) (applying § 3109 to police entry of business premises); United States v. Mullin, 329 F.2d
295, 298-99 (4th Cir. 1964) (§ 3109 does apply to smokehouse within curtilage of farm); with
United States v. Francis, 646 F.2d 251, 256 (6th Cir.) (holding that § 3109 does not apply to
businesses), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981); United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 700 (8th
Cir. 1976) (expressing serious doubt that § 3109 applies to business premises), cert. denied, 429
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section 3109 to businesses have relied on the policy justifications for
announcement. 13 Courts denying section 3109 protection to businesses have reasoned that the statutory reference to "house" implicitly excludes businesses or nondwellings. 14 Courts also have invoked
the common law as support for denying section 3109 protection to
businesses. 15 These cases have recognized constitutional business announcement requirements, but have limited this protection by characterizing the expectations of business occupants as a "lesser"
privacy interest.16
This Note argues that the courts should reject a home-business
distinction in the application of announcement requirements. The
Note concludes that announcement rules should apply whenever
their underlying policies are served. This approach would apply announcement requirements to closed and occupied business premises.
Part I examines the arguments offered by some courts for a restrictive interpretation of announcement protections in the business
context. Part I suggests that these arguments are unpersuasive and
that the courts' application of announcement rules should correspond to the policies behind them. Part II argues that the policy
justifications for announcement are served in the business context to
a degree that justifies full announcement protection. Part III contends that reduced announcement protection for businesses does not
advance legitimate police interests.
I.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANNOUNCEMENT PROTECTION FOR
BUSINESS PREMISES: UNITED STATES v FRANCIS

The Sixth Circuit's opinion in UnitedStates v. Francis'7 offers the
U.S. 1045 (1977); United States v. Johns, 466 F.2d 1364, 1365 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that
§ 3109 does not apply to business); Fields v. United States, 355 F.2d 543 (5th Cir.) (per
curiam) (building constructed for commercial purposes and outside curtilage not protected),
cert. dismissed,384 U.S. 935 (1966); United States v. Hassell, 336 F.2d 684, 686 (6th Cir. 1964)
(a pre-FrancisSixth Circuit case observing that § 3109 applied only to dwellings but decided
on other grounds), cer. denied, 380 U.S. 965 (1965).
For examples of this conflict at the trial level, compare United States v. La Monte, 455 F.
Supp. 952, 966-67 & n.16 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (although holding § 3109 announcement requirements were satisfied, the court noted that § 3109 appeared to apply to commercial establishments as well as houses), with United States v. Giacalone, 455 F. Supp. 26, 36 n.3 (E.D. Mich.
1977) (notes that § 3109 does not apply to nondwellings but validates the entry on exigent
circumstances grounds).
13. See, ag., United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 1974).
14. See United States v. Francis, 646 F.2d 251, 256 (6th Cir.), cer. denied, 454 U.S. 1082
(1981); United States v. Johns, 466 F.2d 1364, 1365 (5th Cir. 1972); Fields v. United States, 355
F.2d 543 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 935 (1966).
15. See United States v. Francis, 646 F.2d 251, 255-56 (6th Cir.), ceri. denied, 454 U.S.
1082 (1981); United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 691, 700 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.denied, 429 U.S.
1045 (1977).
16. See Francis, 646 F.2d at 258; Agrwa, 541 F.2d at 700.
17. 646 F.2d 251 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
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most thorough judicial discussion of announcement protection for
businesses.13 The court concluded that the unannounced entry of a
locked, occupied barbershop did not violate either section 3109 or
the fourth amendment. In reaching this result under the statute, the
court thought itself bound to "continue to restrict the application of
§ 3109 to dwellings and buildings within the curtilage, the extent of
the rule as it existed at common law."19 The court justified the constitutional result by concluding that "[t]here is much less of a privacy
interest in business premises than exists in a private home."20
The Francis court separately addressed the statutory and constitutional questions of announcement protection for business. Following this division, Part A looks at the conclusion in Francis that
section 3109 is limited to dwellings, and concludes that the common
law did not permit unannounced entry of nondwellings. The statute,
furthermore, has undergone considerable judicial development and
accordingly should not be limited by a mechanical reading of the
statutory language or a restrictive interpretation of common law authority. Part B discusses the constitutional question and argues that
a general home-business distinction is unjustified in light of applicable fourth amendment precedent.
A.

Section 3109

The Francis court's reliance on the common law is misplaced be-

cause the common law never condoned unannounced entry of
nondwellings. The accepted source of announcement requirements
is Semayne's Case.2' The court held that where the sheriff was exe-

cuting the King's process forcible entry into homes was allowed, but
announcement was required.22 The court also proscribed any entry
18. Most opinions treat the issue extremely cursorily. See, eg., United States v. Case, 435
F.2d 766, 770 n.1 (7th Cir. 1970) (treating issue in one sentence footnote); Fields v. United
States, 355 F.2d 543 (5th Cir.) (two-paragraph per curiam opinion), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S.
935 (1966). There is also a brief discussion of the issue in United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d
690, 697-700 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977). Only one commentator has
treated the issue at all. See Comment, The Permissibilityof ForcibleEntriesby Police in Electronic Surveillance, 57 B.U. L. REv. 587, 596 (1977) (concluding the home-business distinction drawn inAgntsa is unjustified) [hereinafter cited as B.U. CommI'r]. In spite of the lack
of serious treatment by courts or commentators, the question arises not infrequently and has
spawned a significant conflict of authority. See note 12 supra.
19. 646 F.2d at 256. The "curtilage" includes those buildings in close proximity to a
dwelling.
20. 646 F.2d at 258.
21. 5 Coke's Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603).
22. See Semaynes Case, 5 Coke's Rep. at 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195.
[The sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the party's house, either to arrest him,
or to do other execution of the King's process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he
breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open the
doors ....
For a description of how the common law announcement requirements for the execution of
civil process evolved as constraints on criminal process, see generally Blakey, supra note 11.
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of a home, but not a business, whether announced or not, by23a private person or by the sheriff at the suit of a private creditor.
Other cases reinforce the notion that the proscription against entry by a private suitor did not apply to nondwellings at common law.

The common law did approve forcible entries of barns, 2 4 stores, 25
warehouses 26 and railroad stations27 to execute civil process. Al-

though the Franciscourt cited these cases as establishing the lawfulness of unannounced entry into nondwellings outside the curtilage, 28
careful reading reveals that the common law did not necessarily condone unannounced entry of nondwellings.
Most cases did not discuss announcement at all.29 Where the

facts indicate that unannounced entries occurred, the involved
nondwellings were unoccupied,30 a condition that still excuses noncompliance with announcement requirements. 31 In a rare nondwelling case discussing the announcement requirement, the court,
having acknowledged the right to enter forcibly, wrote: "[The defendant sheriff] was therefore justified in breaking into the warehouse in question, to serve an attachment on the goods of any person
23. See Blakey, supra note 11, at 500.
24. Penton v. Brown, 1 Keble 698, 83 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1644).
25. Haggerty v. Wilber, 16 Johns. 287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819).
26. Burton v. Wilkinson, 18 Vt. 186 (1846).
27. Androscoggin R.R. v. Richards, 41 Me. 233 (1856).
28. Francis, 646 F.2d at 256 (citingPenton v. Brown and Burton v. Wilkinson); see Blakey,
supra note 11, at 501 & n.16, 505 & n.58 (citing Penton v. Brown, Hodder Y. Williams, Haggerty
v. Wrlbur and Burton v. Wilkinson).
29. Of the cases cited by Francis and Blakey, see note 28 supra, only Wilkinson discusses
announcement. See note 32infra. In Hodder v. Williams, [1895] 2 Q.B. 663 (C.A.), the sheriff
had requested admittance before breaking down the door of a workshop outside the curtilage.
Lord Esher relies on Penton v. Browne, I Keble 698, 83 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1644), and Lee
v. Gansel, 1 Cowp. 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 935 (K.B. 1774), for the proposition that the privilege
against forcible entry extends only to the dwelling-house "and does not include other buildings
such as barns or outhouses not connected with a dwelling-house ...." [1895] 2 Q.B. at 666.
It is unclear, however, whether forcible entry of such buildings would be permitted where no
announcement had been made.
In Lee v. Gansel, 1 Cowp. 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 935 (K.B.1774), Lord Mansfield held that the
privilege applied only to the outer door of a dwelling house. The sheriff in Lee had been
peacefully admitted to the building, but had had to break down the door of a lodger. As to this
second door, Lord Mansfield noted "that after notice the officers broke it open; though nothing
turns upon the notice or mode of breaking." 1 Cowp. at 5, 98 Eng. Rep. at 937.
30. The courts noted the fact that the nondwellings were unoccupied in approving the
contemplated entries. See Haggerty, 16 Johns. at 288 ("Mhe sheriff had a right, no person
being in the actual occupation of [the store] . . .to open it for the purpose of sale.
...
)
(emphasis added); Penton, 1 Keble at 698, 83 Eng. Rep. at 1193 ("there being no particular
place where the sheriff may make demand"); see also A4ndroscoggin J?.R, 41 Me. at 238
("There was no person in the depot, or around it, at the time of its entry by the officer, from
whom he could have demanded admission.").
31. See, eg., Payne v. United States, 508 F.2d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
933 (1975); United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40, 44 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864
(1973).
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therein; - but he must first demand admittance." 32 Since the defendant had, in fact, requested the warehouse key, the court upheld
33
the entry.
In all likelihood, the dearth of discussion of announcement protection for occupied nondwellings results from the fact that the officers almost always announced themselves.3 4 This, of course, does

not necessarily imply that common law judges, if faced with the issue, would have required announcement in the nondwelling context.
It does demonstrate that reliance on the proposition that the com-

mon law denied nondwelling announcement protection is misplaced.
With the question thus at least left open by the common
law, modem
35
courts must resolve the issue through other devices.
Accordingly, the Francis court's conclusion depends on the prop-

osition that since announcement was not affirmatively required by
the common law prior to entry of nondwellings, it cannot be re-

quired under section 3109. This implies that Congress intended to
freeze judicial development of announcement rules by codifying

only those required at common law. In line with this type of reasoning, the Francis court, as well as other courts,3 6 observed that "[b]y

its terms § 3109 applies only to 'houses.' ",37 This reasoning is subject to two grounds of attack. First, the statute does not even ex-

pressly address the ability of police officers to enter business
premises, much less abandon the possibility of an announcement requirement prior to entry. Second, a "freeze" on judicial development
of announcement rules conflicts with the liberal application that

courts have previously given section 3109.
The preliminary problem with finding congressional intent38 to
limit announcement protection to dwellings is the failure of section
32. Burton v. Wilkinson, 18 Vt. 186, 190 (1846). Burton v. Wilkinson is cited by the Francis
court, see 646 F.2d at 256, as holding that unannounced entry of nondwellings was permissible. In fact, the sheriff involved had requested admittance, so the question of unannounced
entry was not before the court. In dictum, however, the court relied on Penton and Haggerty
for the statement that "[a]
barn in the field [i.e., outside the curtilagel may be opened without
request." 18 Vt. at 189. See Blakey, supra note 11, at 505 & n.58.
33. 18 Vt. at 190.
34. See Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 143-44 & nn.20-22 (1970).
35. The Francis court also relied on the statutory language. But see notes 43-53 infra and
accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 466 F.2d 1364, 1365 (5th Cir. 1972); Fields v. United
States, 355 F.2d 543, 543 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 935 (1966).
37. 646 F.2d at 255.
38. Nothing in the limited legislative history of§ 3109 reveals an intent to limit announcement to dwellings. Section 3109 was based on the Espionage Act, ch. 30, tit. XI, §§ 8, 9, 40
Stat. 217, 229 (1917). The original report of that statute states that the law was "based upon
the New York law on this subject and follows generally the policy of that law." 55 CONG. REC.
3307 (1917). New York search warrant rules generally reflected the common law. See People
ex rel. Robert Simpson Co. v. Kempner, 208 N.Y. 16, 20-23, 101 N.E. 794, 796-97 (1913);
Blakey, supra note 11, at 513 n.98.
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3109 to describe police entry of businesses at all. The statute authorizes police to "break open. . . any part of a house," and conditions
this authority on the giving of "notice of. . . authority and purpose."'39 Congress evidently thought it proper that police, in possession of a valid search warrant, be allowed to enter private dwellings
if they announce their presence and their purpose.

This structure does not suggest the extreme conclusion that Congress intended to sanction unannounced police entries of business

premises.40 Given the uncertain status of business announcement
protection at common law,41 and the sparse legislative history of
section 3109,42 it is unlikely that Congress ever considered whether
announcement should be made prior to entry of business premises.
Given the statute's failure to speak directly to the issue, and the
ambiguity surrounding its common law ancestry, the courts must inquire more deeply into the purposes of section 3109. 43 Facile reliance on the statutory language or on the limits of judicial authority

offers little guidance when either plausible interpretation risks contravening an unclear legislative intention. A more searching analysis
of the policies underlying announcement requirements better comports with sound principles of statutory construction, 44 the evolving
39. 18 U.S.C. § 3109, supra note 2.
40. Note the similar question in Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979). There, despite the lack of an express statutory authorization, the Court ruled that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976), implicitly
granted power to forcibly enter unoccupied private premises for the purpose of installing surveillance equipment. 441 U.S. at 249-54. In Dalia, the Court expressly recognized that the
"manner of execution" of the implicit Title III power of forcible entry "is subject to later
judicial review as to its reasonableness." 441 U.S. at 258. Similarly, since § 3109 implied the
power to enter business premises forcibly, the manner of its execution must be subject to applicable restraints. Although it was argued (see Brief for Government at 31-32), the Court in
Dalia significantly did not rely on a home-business distinction in approving the entry. The
Court did reject the defendant's § 3109 claim, as well as the constitutional claim, noting that
the involved premises were unoccupied and that announcement would have precluded gathering any evidence by covert electronic surveillance. 441 U.S. at 247-48.
41. See notes 21-35 supra and accompanying text.
42. See note 38 supra.
43. See McGill v. EPA, 593 F.2d 631, 636 (5th Cir. 1979) ("It would be sophistry for us to
divine a congressional intent on a subject it did not consider."). John Gray's words apply
quite clearly here:
Interpretation is generally spoken of as if its chief function was to discover what the
meaning of the Legislature really was. But when a Legislature has had a real intention,
one way or another, on a point, it is not once in a hundred times that any doubt arises to
what its intention was. If that were all that ajudge had to do with a statute, interpretation
of statutes, instead of being one of the most difficult of a judge's duties, would be extremely easy. The fact is that the difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the
Legislature has had no meaning at all; when the question which is raised on the statute
never occurred to it; when what the judges have to do is, not to determine what the Legislature did mean on a point which was present to its mind, but to guess what it would have
intended on a point not present to its mind, if the point had been present.
J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SoURcEs OF THE LAW 165 (1909).
44. See Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), affd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945) (L.
Hand, J.) ('[I]t is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to
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merger of statutory and constitutional standards in this area, 45 and

the Supreme Court's admonition that fundamental protections
against police intrusion should be given more than "grudging

application." 46

Past judicial freedom in the application of announcement rules

further undermines the assumption that Congress intended to limit,
by passage of section 3109, the evolution of announcement rules to

those in force at common law and expressly required by statute. The
courts have extended the statute, in other cases, to situations plainly

beyond the scope of the statutory language or the requirements of
common law. For example, section 3109 requirements routinely re-

47
strict entries made to effect arrests or searches incident to arrest,
although the statute expressly applies only to the execution o.search
warrants. 48 Similarly, although the statute expressly requires an-

nouncement only prior to a "breaking," the Supreme Court, in Sabbath v. United States,49 interpreted section 3109 to forbid peaceful,
unannounced entries. Sabbath applies announcement requirements

to peaceful entries in spite of the common law requirement of
force, 50 controverting the notion that section 3109 requires announcement only where explicitly compelled by the common law.51
Sabbath provides a good illustration of the fundamental problem
with the Francis court's analysis of section 3109. The Francis court

took an unjustifiably narrow view ofjudicial ability to apply the congressional mandate provided by section 3109 to situations not neces-

sarily governed by the common law or the statutory language. The
Court's language in Sabbath is instructive: "To be sure, the statute

uses the phrase 'break open' and that connotes some use of force.
make a fortress out of the dictionary, but to remember that statutes always have some purpose
or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to
their meaning.").
45. See note I1 supra.
46. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589 (1968); see notes 47-53 infra and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306 (1958); United States v. Murrie,
534 F.2d 695 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 701 n.25 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977). For a full description of this development, see Blakey,
supra note 11, at 510-526.
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (quoted at note 2 supra).
49. 391 U.S. 585 (1968). For a discussion of this development, see LOYOLA COMMENT,
supra note 2.
50. See United States v. Bowman, 137 F. Supp. 385, 388 (D.D.C. 1956); Walker v. Fox, 32
Ky. 290 (2 Dana *404) (1834); Welsh v. Wilson, 34 Minn. 92, 24 N.W. 327 (1885); Blakey,
supra note 11, at 501, 505.
51. The Court, significantly, approved this departure from the common law while simultaneously taking occasion to announce that § 3109 codified the common law. 391 U.S. at 591
n.8. See also People v. Bradley, I Cal. 3d 80, 87, 460 P.2d 129, 133, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457, 461
(1969) (citing Sabbath for the proposition that codification of common law announcement
rules does not necessarily "freeze" those rules).
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But linguistic analysis seldom is adequate when a statute is designed
to incorporate fundamental values and the ongoing development of
the common law." 52 The Supreme Court plainly did not view either
the common law or the statutory language as a bar to judicial extension of announcement rules to situations implicating announcement
values. Accordingly, courts should evaluate the question of announcement protection for businesses with an eye toward the interests served, invoking section 3109 whenever its policies so require.53
B. ConstitutionalAnnouncement Protection
The recognition that announcement protects fundamental values
has recently led courts to conclude that announcement, at least prior
to police entry of dwellings, is constitutionally required.5 4 The acknowledged source of announcement's constitutional stature is Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Ker v. Calffornia.55 Since Justice
Brennan finds the source of the constitutional announcement rule in
52. 391 U.S. at 589 (footnote omitted). This language undercuts the observation in Francis
that "it is not the place of the courts to extend a statute's application to all situations where a
similar policy might be desirable." 646 F.2d at 256.
53. See United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 1974).
54. The Supreme Court initially faced the question whether announcement is constitutionally required in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). Ker involved an apartment rather than
business premises and the discussion centered on whether announcement is constitutionally
required prior to entry of a private dwelling. Although a plurality of the Court approved the
constitutionality of the unannounced entry in Ker, the Court relied on exigent circumstances.
The Court's reliance on exigent circumstances, rather than the lack of a constitutional rule,
implies that announcement is constitutionally required absent exigent circumstances. See 2 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 4.8 at 132 (1978).
It is arguable that this conclusion misreads Ker. The Ker plurality opinion never explicitly
acknowledges a constitutional announcement rule. Also, in a post-Ker announcement case
involving section 3109, the Court noted in dicta that "[e]xceptions to anypossible constilutional
rule relating to announcement and entry have been recognized ....
" Sabbath v. United
States, 391 U.S. 585, 591 n.8 (emphasis supplied). The italicized language seems inconsistent
with the conclusion that Ker conclusively established a constitutional announcement rule.
On the whole, however, the implication of a constitutional basis for announcement appears
well founded. Justice Brennan, in hisKer dissent, extensively reviewed the rule's common law
history and wrote:
The requirement is no mere procedural nicety or formality attendant upon the service of a
warrant. Decisions in both the federal and state courts have recognized, as did the English courts, that the requirement is of the essence of the substantive protections which
safeguard individual liberty.
374 U.S. at 49 (footnote omitted) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Clark's plurality opinion did
not address Brennan's constitutional analysis, reasoning that exigent circumstances had justified noncompliance with announcement rules. The force of Brennan's opinion in the face of
Clark's silence (or tacit approval) had led the overwhelming weight of authority to conclude
that Ker established a constitutional announcement rule. See, e.g., United States v. Murrie,
534 F.2d 695 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 9 (9th Cir.
1973), ceri. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); United States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992, 1002 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971); United States ex rel. Ametrane v. Gable, 401 F.2d 765
(3d Cir. 1968); Sonnenreich & Ebner, supra note 3; B.U. Comrmr, supra note 18; Note, supra
note 34.
55. 374 U.S. 23, 46 (1963).
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its extensive application at common law,5 6 many of the same considerations that govern application of section 3109 naturally inform the

sound development of a constitutional rule.5 7 Moreover, modern

application of section 3109 has often pursued the important policy of
protecting the privacy of individuals who occupy premises during
police entry.5 8 This strengthens the parallel between the two rules,
since the question of whether privacy expectations are protected constitutes a conventional
fourth amendment inquiry as to the reason59
ableness of a search.
Although the Supreme Court has never treated the business protection issue in an announcement case,6° it has applied the fourth
56. 374 U.S. at 47-60. Beginning with Semayne's Case, 5 Coke's Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep.
194 (K.B. 1603), Brennan traces common law announcement requirements to the point when
the Bill of Rights was passed and beyond. He concludes that the requirement was established
and confirmed in England long before the passage of the Bill of Rights and that early American courts continued to apply it. 374 U.S. at 47-50. Brennan argues that the Framers intended
to carry forward in the fourth amendment those protections afforded under English law. 374
U.S. at 51. Moreover, he argues that announcement was usually given prior to execution of
the dreaded general warrants and writs of assistance. Since the colonial experience under
these writs was the prime motivation for the fourth amendment, Brennan concludes that it is
untenable that common law announcement requirements are not embraced by the fourth
amendment. 374 U.S. at 52.
57. The Supreme Court's seminal statutory and constitutional announcement decisions reveal this parallel. In Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958), the Court (per Justice Brennan) undertook historical examination of announcement requirements similar to Brennan's
Ker analysis in deciding that § 3109 principles invalidated an unannounced police entry. In
arguing that the Miller result ought to control the facts in Ker, Brennan concluded that "the
history adduced in Miller in support of the nonconstitutional ground persuasively demonstrates that the Fourth Amendment's protections include the security of the householder
against unannounced invasions by the police." 374 U.S. at 53. See also note 56 supra.
58. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); Blakey, supra note 11, at 554;
Note, supra note 34, at 152. Indeed, the ultimate dispute about whether announcement protection should be extended to business premises under both rules may center on whether privacy
interests in business premises are sufficient to warrant the extension. Although the Francis
court appeared to agree that similarities between dwellings and businesses might justify as
good policy extension of§ 3109 to business, the court criticized such an extension of the statute
for failure to account for the difference in privacy interests. 646 F.2d at 256. Similarly, the
court concluded that a difference in privacy interests warranted application of "reduced" constitutional announcement protection for business. 646 F.2d at 258. This Note concludes that
privacy interests in a business are protected by announcement to a degree that justifies application of both rules to business premises. See notes 84-95 infra and accompanying text.
59. The landmark decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967), focused
subsequent fourth amendment inquiry on whether a "reasonable expectation of privacy" is
jeopardized. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion) (reasonable expectation of privacy in brick-shaped packages wrapped in opaque plastic and stored in trunk of
car), overruled in United States v. Ross, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982) ("automobile exception" to
warrant requirement extends to closed containers in vehicle that police have probable cause to
believe may contain contraband); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-46 (1979) (defendant
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed); United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (reasonable expectation of privacy in a locked footlocker in trunk
of automobile required police to obtain a warrant before searching it).
60. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), involving a laundry, the Court
invalidated an arrest-related entry on announcement grounds without distinguishing between
houses and commercial premises. However, the laundry was apparently "within the curtilage"
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amendment to businesses in several other settings. 61 In UnitedStates
v. Francis62 and United States v. Agrusa,63 however, the courts de-

nied constitutional announcement protection to the involved businesses, relying on assertions that business premises generally
implicate "lesser" privacy expectations." The Franciscourt, quoting
the Supreme Court, observed that "'physical entry of the home is
the chief evil against which the working [sic] of the fourth amendment is directed.' 6 5 The Court66has made similar observations in
the context of business premises.
As a constitutional matter, the conclusion that businesses as a
class receive reduced fourth amendment protection is questionable.
In fact, the weight of authority suggests that businesses receive full
fourth amendment protection. The Supreme Court has found that
warrantless searches of shared offices, 67 warehouses, 68 and plants 69
of a dwelling, and consequently the case has only slight significance. See Francis, 646 F.2d at
256-57. Some interesting dicta have recently been uttered by Justice Rehnquist in an opinion
concurring in the Court's judgment upholding warrantless inspections authorized by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, § 103(a), 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (Supp. III 1979). Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 608 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The Court upheld
searches, in part, because the mining industry had been pervasively regulated. 452 U.S. at 60506. Justice Rehnquist rejected this ground for decision because he had "no doubt that had
Congress enacted a criminal statute similar to that involved here- authorizing, for example,
unannouncedwarrantless searches of property reasonably thought to house unlawful drug activity-the warrantless search would be struck down under our existing Fourth Amendment
line of decisions .... despite the fact that Congress... has in fact pervasively regulated such
crime ..
" 452 U.S. at 608 (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist also noted that while not
all warrantless administrative searches of commercial property violate the fourth amendment,
"the proprietor of commercial property is protected from unreasonable intrusions by governmental agents... "' 452 U.S. at 608. The significance of this dicta stems in part from the
fact that its author has narrowly construed the fourth amendment in other contexts. See, e.g.,
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 223-31 (1981) (Relnquist, J., dissenting); Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 621 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. See, ag., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
62. 646 F.2d 251 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
63. 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977).
64. See Francis, 646 F.2d at 258 ("There is much less of a privacy interest in business
premises than exists in a private home.");AgnrSa, 541 F.2d at 697 ("Business premises, while
entitled to protection under the Fourth Amendment, are not entitled to the same protection
which is afforded a home.").
65. 646 F.2d at 258 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980)); see note 91
infra (criticizing use of Fayton). Although the Francis court quoted Payton as interpreting the
"working" of the fourth amendment, the original language referred to the "wording" of the
fourth amendment.
66. "The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go
about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property." See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967), quotedin Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 312 (1978).
67. See, eg., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
68. See, ag., See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
69. See Marshall v. Barrows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
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all violate the fourth amendment. The Court was not troubled by
the amendment's reference to "houses," 70 concluding that this language should not be taken literally.71 No Supreme Court case has
relied on a general distinction between homes and business premises.72 Though an especially egregious privacy intrusion occurs during unannounced entry of the home, it does not follow that
unannounced entry of private business premises is not an intrusion,
or that there is less than full fourth amendment protection against
one.
Any home-business distinction acknowledged by the Court responds to "relatively unique circumstances" that are "carefully defined. ' 73 The Court has held that a strong regulatory interest,
coupled with a reduced privacy expectation due to a history of pervasive governmental oversight, justifies warrantless inspection of certain businesses.74 The warrantless searches approved by the Court
were statutorily 75 required to be made during business hours and
70. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend.
IV.
71. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 367 (1968).
72. See B.U. COMMENT, supra note 18, at 596.
73. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978).
74. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 314-17 (1972) (firearms dealers); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (liquor industry). Both the liquor
and firearms industries had historically been subject to government regulation and oversight.
Thus, the Court observed in Biswell:
It is also plain that inspections for compliance with the Gun Control Act pose only
limited threats to the dealer's justifiable expectations of privacy. When a dealer chooses
to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license, he does so
with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to
effective inspection.
406 U.S. at 316.
The home-business distinction that the FrancisandAgrasa courts employed to justify "reduced" constitutional announcement protection for businesses is not limited in any of these
respects. Their distinction applied to businesses generally, not simply those in which the government has a special interest. Nor was the distinction conditioned on any advance knowledge
that occupants of business premises may have that they are subject to unannounced police
entries. Significantly, even though the Court acknowledged a "reduced" privacy interest in
Colonade, the Court invalidated the government agent's destruction of a lock in order to seize
contraband liquor. In Colonade the owner of the premises was aware of the agent's authority
and still refused to open a locked storeroom. 397 U.S. at 73. The Court concluded that since
Congress failed expressly to authorize forceful entry in the event of such a refusal, the search
was unreasonable. 397 U.S. at 77. The Court similarly softened its approval of the warrantless
inspection scheme in Biswell with the observation that the owner of the premises "was on
notice as to [the officers'] identity and the legal basis for their action." 406 U.S. 314-15.
75. In Biswell, the Court approved a provision of the Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976)), which allows official entry
"during business hours, [into] the premises (including places of storage) of any firearms or
ammunition... dealer.., for the purpose of inspecting or examining (I) any records or
documents required to be kept.. . and (2) any firearms or ammunition kept or stored by such
...dealer ... at such premises." 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1976). See Biswell, 406 U.S. at 311-13.
The procedure for inspection of liquor dealers, validated in Colonnade, is nearly identical. See
26 U.S.C. §§ 5146(b), 7606 (1976); Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 73-74. Note, however, that while
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were limited to specific times. This limited ability to search without

a warrant satisfied the Court that, given the strong public interest in
supervising gun and liquor dealers, fourth amendment requirements
were fulfilled. 76 The absence of such careful legislative tailoring to a
particularly strong public purpose led the Court to strike down on
constitutional grounds a municipal ordinance that provided a warrantless inspection
scheme applicable to all types of business
77
premises.
In Francis and Agrusa, the courts merely asserted that business
premises received fourth amendment announcement protection in
some lesser, but unarticulated, degree.78 The general home-business
distinction described in those cases sweeps across a broad range of
business premises without any attempt to specify why fourth amendment protection is lesser in all of them than in a private home. It is
difficult to understand how this vague formulation can be carefully
circumscribed to avoid encroachment on protected privacy interests.79 The absence of an ability to support the distinction with careful reasoning and identifiable limits suggests that the Francis and
the Court upheld the liquor inspection procedure, it also held that the fine for refusal to permit
inspection was an exclusive remedy, precluding forcible entries unless a warrant was obtained.
Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 76-77.
76. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
77. See See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (fire code inspections). In Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978), the Court reaffirmed See, and observed that the ColonnadeBiswell exceptions to fundamental fourth amendment protections "are indeed exceptions, but
they represent responses to relatively unique circumstances."
78. See Francis, 646 F.2d at 258 ("Assuming some fourth amendment rule of announcement for a business, we do not need to decide the full extent of such a rule here."); see also
note 64 supra.
79. The requirement that exceptions to fourth amendment protection be carefully tailored
to the rationale for applying reduced protection stems from the notion that "unbridled discretion" of executive officers will undermine fourth amendment values. See Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 357 (1977)
("[Olne of the Court's critical concerns in Camara and See was the discretion of the seizing
officers."). In announcement contexts, the broad Francis.Agrusa home-business privacy distinction is susceptible to similar dangers. Since all business premises, even the most private,
receive diminished constitutional protection under this standard, police will have discretion to
subvert announcement values. See notes 84-110 infra and accompanying text (describing the
values of announcement protection for business).
The facts of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), admirably illustrate the defects
with so sweeping a distinction between the fourth amendment protection of homes and that of
businesses. The Court held that a police search of a newspaper office for evidence of crime
committed by third parties did not offend the fourth amendment when executed pursuant to a
valid warrant. An unreflective approach to the home-business distinction would not even require a warrant in this case, since the place to be searched is not a dwelling. Indeed, Justice
Stewart's powerful dissent in Zurcher advanced the conclusion that the nature of the business
conducted at the premises to be searched could give rise to greater protection than that afforded private homes. The sweeping label of "business premises" includes not only newspaper
offices, but the offices of lawyers, psychiatrists, accountants, and other fiduciaries. Minimal
fourth amendment protection of repositories of sensitive information, such as these, presents a
grave risk to individual privacy.
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Agrusa courts' resolution of the issue does not conform to fourth
amendment precedent.3 0
A careful look at the circumstances of unannounced police entry
onto business premises is warranted and required before approving
reduced constitutional protection. This Note concludes that no
unique characteristics are presented, apriori, simply because police
are searching business premises as opposed to a dwelling. The reasons that announcement requirements have attained constitutional
status in the dwelling context apply with sufficient force to business
premises so that a general home-business distinction cannot operate
to ensure the protection of fundamental announcement values.
II.

POLICIES FOR EXTENDING ANNOUNCEMENT PROTECTION TO
BUSINESS PREMISES

Courts that have not adopted a restrictive interpretation of their
authority to extend announcement requirements to business premises have concluded that the policies underlying announcement justify such an extension, 81 an approach which the Supreme Court has
upheld as an appropriate exercise of judicial authority. 82 Common
law announcement rules have undergone substantial judicial devel83
opment in response to the dictates of their underlying policies.
Since most announcement cases involve dwellings, announcement
policies have been described almost exclusively in that context. An
examination of the policies that justify announcement protection for
dwellings, however, reveals that protection for business premises is
warranted also.
A. Privacy

The court in UnitedStates v. Francisconcluded that privacy protection was the most critical announcement policy.84 In denying announcement protection to business, the court concluded that cases
involving business premises as opposed to dwellings implicated
lesser privacy interests. 85 The court based this conclusion on the
"precept that 'a man's home is his castle.' "86 It is, of course, intui80. See note 74 supra.

81. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 1974).
82. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 588 (1968); notes 47-53 supra and accompanying text.
83. See notes 47-53 supra and accompanying text.
84. 646 F.2d at 258. The Francis court may have found privacy the most critical announcement policy because it apparently agrees that other announcement values apply equally
to business premises. 646 F.2d at 256.
85. 646 F.2d at 258.
86. 646 F.2d at 256. The famous maxim "Every man's house is his castle" received its
classic expression in William Pitt's remarks dining a Parliamentary debate on a proposed cider
tax. See Blakey, supra note 11, at 500 n.7.
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tively obvious that the greatest sense of privacy may exist in the
home. But a careful look at the realities surrounding unannounced
police entry of private premises suggests that the particular privacy
expectations at stake are similar in the dwelling and business
contexts.
The privacy interests that announcement protects are the interests of occupants in not being shocked or embarrassed when private
premises are subjected to an unexpected intrusion.87 If police enter
private premises unannounced, and possibly forcibly, it is natural for
occupants to be frightened and embarrassed. The fear and shock
caused by unannounced police entry arise at the point when an occupant realizes an unexpected intrusion is taking or has taken place.
These fleeting, though intense, emotions will dissipate when occupants become aware that the intruders are police conducting an authorized investigation. Embarrassment created by unannounced
police entry results from an occupant's lack of notice and consequent
inability to prepare for intruders who may become privy to embarrassing facts or circumstances.88
Announcement affords an occupant an opportunity to admit police in a dignified manner. An unannounced entry of closed business
premises is likely to expose occupants to the same possibility of
trauma as occupants of a home. Once an occupant has secured his
business premises and holds an expectation that the premises will
not be entered by intruders, he is likely to be fearful when that expectation is breached.8 9 Similarly, an occupant of business premises
who is engaged in compromising activities will be as unable to
avoid embarrassment as an occupant of a dwelling when police unexpectedly enter.
Announcement requirements do not protect the principle that "a
87. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 57 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
88. Some observers have suggested that announcement may prevent police from barging

into private premises while occupants are undressed or are engaged in sexual activity. See
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 617 (1980) (White, J., dissenting); Sonnenreich & Ebner,
supra note 3, at 647.
89. Some commentators have criticized the constitutional stature of the privacy element in
announcement cases. See Sonnenreich & Ebner, supra note 3, at 647; Blakey, supra note 11, at
525-26. However, the psychological security retained by an occupant in control of private
premises is also an important element of privacy. See Note, supra note 34, at 153.
90. It might be argued that embarrassing circumstances are more likely to arise if a dwelling, as opposed to a business, is entered unannounced. Certainly at night it is more likely that
sexual activity will take place in a dwelling than in a business. However, there is no assurance
that occupants who have secured their private business premises will not indulge in sexual
conduct. Although this scenario seems less likely, it is still a contingency. The simple fact that
sexual activity is less likely to take place during the daytime does not justify an unannounced
daytime entry of a dwelling. Moreover, other situations can be imagined which are equally as

likely to occur in a business as in a home. Consider the possibility that an occupant might be
conducting a sensitive, private phone conversation. Unannounced police officers might be
able to eavesdrop if the occupants are unaware of their intrusion. This situation seems at least
as likely to occur in an office, for example, as in a home.
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man's home is his castle." Announcement prescribes only the manner in which an authorized entry will occur.9 ' Police authority to
enter private premises is neither reduced nor enhanced 92 by requiring that police entries be announced. If an occupant fails to respond

to announcement, police may enter by whatever means necessary.
Announcement, rather, protects the threshold expectation that
unannounced intruders will not enter private premises. Plainly, in
the home, where there is a high intuitive sense of privacy, this
threshold test is met. The same expectation, however, may exist in
premises with a lesser intuitive sense of privacy. Consider the barbershop involved in Francis. During business hours, much of the
premises is open to general public view and ingress and egress. 93 Af91. The distinction between authority and means is never discussed in FrancisandAgrusa.
Francis cited Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), for the proposition that the fourth
amendment is designed to protect against unauthorized entry of the home. Francis,646 F.2d

at 258. Payton overturned the warrantless entry of a home for the purpose of effecting an
arrest. The Court stressed that the "Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance
to the house." 445 U.S. at 590. The Francis court implied that the line is not as firm for
businesses. 646 F.2d at 258. This reasoning is questionable, however, in light of other language in Payton. See 445 U.S. at 587 ("'It is one thing to seize without a warrant property
resting in an open area... and it is quite another thing to effect a warrantless seizure of
property, even that owned by a corporation, situated on private premises to which access is not
otherwise available for the seizing officer.' ") (quoting G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,
429 U.S. 338, 354 (1977)).
As to police authority to enter homes, the Payton court observed: "[Warrantless search and
arrest entries] share this fundamental characteristic: the breach of the entrance to an individual's home." 445 U.S. at 589. Since police may not enter homes without a warrant, occupants' intuitive privacy expectations are protected. However, once a warrant is obtained,
announcement requirements, which prescribe only the means of entry, provide little additional
protection to these privacy expectations. Even where announcement is made, an individual's
privacy, in the sense that his premises are a "castle" from which he can exclude the state, can
be breached by forcible police entry whether a home or business is involved. Thus, Payton
speaks only to the authority necessary to enter certain premises, not to the means by which that
authority may be exercised.
The other support offered in Francis andAgrusafails for similar reasons. United States v.
Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1978), citedin Francis, 646 F.2d at 258, involved the warrantless use of an electronic beeper. See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), cited in Agrusa, 541
F.2d at 697, involved warrantless safety inspections. The inquiry as to whether a warrant is
required involves the justifications needed for authorizing police entry onto an individual's
premises. This says nothing about the manner in which an authorized breach is to be
executed.
92. It might be possible for an occupant of private premises, if announcement is made, to
better ensure that police conduct their search according to the terms of the warrant as the
Constitution requires. See generaly Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (while acting pursuant to a search warrant, police may seize only those things particularly described in
the warrant). If police are greeted at the door and the search warrant is examined by the
occupant, it seems less likely that police will unobtrusively exceed the limits of their authority
under the warrant than if an occupant is subjected to the flurry of activity that may accompany
an unannounced entry. Accordingly, the ability of police to enter and search intuitively private areas of the home may be slightly enhanced by unannounced entry. However, occupants
of business premises also have a strong and protected interest in seeing that a police search is
limited to that authorized. See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344'(1931).
93. Of course, commercial premises during ordinary business hours are not protected to
the same degree as a private home. This is due, however, to the fact that the general public is
invited to enter. Fourth amendment protection for any premises, dwelling or nondwelling, is

1682

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 81:1666

ter the shop is locked for the day, however, occupants have a reason-

able expectation that the premises will not be entered. When this
expectation is breached, occupants will be surprised and shocked; a

search will expose their private activities to the police. Thus, a
home-business distinction based on a recognition of the greater intu-

itive sense of privacy in the home is unjustified. The particular privacy interests threatened by unannounced police entry are also at
stake for occupants of business premises.
This suggests a closed-open premises distinction rather than a
general home-business distinction. 94

The distinction turns on

whether an occupant expects that the premises are closed to unannounced intruders. Where such an expectation exists, announcement will protect against the surprise occasioned by unannounced
entry. Absent such an expectation, announcement does not implicate privacy interests. Accordingly, if a private business is of such a
nature that an expectation of closure is unreasonable, the announce-

ment policy of protecting privacy will not apply. It is obvious, however, that such an expectation is indeed reasonable in many business
premises.95
B.

Other Policies

Announcement serves two additional functions besides protecting privacy. First, it protects police officers against physical resisreduced when entry occurs as the result of an invitation. Cf. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S.
206, 211 (1966) ("When, as here, the home is converted into a commercial center to which
outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that business is entitled to
no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street. A
government agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do
business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant."); see also 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 2.4(b) at 338-39, and cases cited therein. No
announcement need be made prior to an invited entry. See, e.g., United States v. Blalock, 578
F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1978). Accordingly, this Note only concerns occupied business premises to which police have not been impliedly or expressly invited to enter.
94. Cf. State v. Myers, 601 P.2d 239, 244 (Alaska 1979) (warrantless search of theater pursuant to routine security check valid provided premises unlocked):
Accordingly, we hold that law enforcement personnel may enter commercial premises
without a warrant only when, pursuant to a routine after-hours security check undertaken
to protect the interests of the property owner, it is discovered that the security of the
premises is in jeopardy, and only when there is no reason to believe that the owner would
not consent to such an entry. In the context with which we are immediately concerned,
locked premises must be taken as indicating that no warrantless entry is authorized. Any
search conducted incident to a legitimate entry must be brief and must be limited and
necessary to the purpose of ensuring that no intruders are present on the premises. In
addition, someone responsible for the premises must be informed, as soon as is practicable, of the protective measures taken.
The notice requirement obviously speaks to announcement when the premises are occupied.
95. For example, consider the proprietor's expectation in his bar after it has closed for the
evening. It certainly seems unlikely that the occupants of the barbershop in Francis expected
unannounced intruders. Police had to go through two different sets of locks to accomplish
their entry, one with a battering ram. 646 F.2d at 254.
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tance by surprised occupants who believe them to be trespassers. 96
Second, announcement prevents the needless destruction of property, 97 such as doors or windows that may be broken in the course of
an unannounced entry. Both of these additional interests are as important in the business as in the dwelling context. 98
At common law, the most frequently cited announcement policy
was the officer's safety. Courts recognized that "defense of [a man's]
house may extend even to death, and it is not a felony." 99 Announcement was viewed by courts as necessary to minimize violent
breaches of the King's peace. 100 Modem courts continue to recognize
the significant
danger to police officers posed by unannounced
1
entry.10
These dangers are not confined to dwellings.102 An occupant,
placed in fear of his safety and property by an unexpected intrusion,
is likely to repel the intrusion forcibly whether a business or home is
involved. A private individual is legally entitled to repel unexpected
intrusions onto business premises with as much force as when a
dwelling is involved. There is no basis for suggesting that occupants
of closed business premises are less likely to exercise their right to
defend forcefully against intrusions. In fact, unannounced entries of
some business premises may be more likely to engender retaliatory
violence than similar entries of residential premises. Business premises may contain valuable goods or papers that might induce an oc96. See, ag., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 57-58 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Miller
v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 n.12 (1958).
97. See, ag., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 58 (1963) (Brennan, J.,dissenting); United
States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 1974).
98. See United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 1974). The Francis court

seems to agree that these policies apply to business premises. 646 F.2d at 256 ("some of the
same concerns exist in both situations").
99. Blakey, supra note 11, at 500, describing Semayne's Case, 5 Coke's Rep. 91a, 77 Eng.
Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603). Consider also The Case of RichardCurtis, Fost. 135, 168 Eng. Rep. 67
(K.B. 1757), where the court recognized as a murder defense that a defendant was surprised by
an officer's unannounced entry.
100. See Ratcliffe v. Burton, 3 Bos. & Pu. 223, 229, 127 Eng. Rep. 123, 126 (C.P. 1802);
Lee v. Gansel, 1 Cowp. 1, 6, 98 Eng. Rep. 935, 938 (K.B. 1774).
101. See, ag., Sabbath, 391 U.S. at 589; Miller, 357 U.S. at 313 n.12; Phiips, 497 F.2d at
1134. It is not clear that the only danger presented by a failure to announce is to the police.
Police, sensing danger, may open up all available firepower on occupants who resist an unannounced intrusion. See Note, supra note 34, at 153 & n.63. Consider the multiple, conflicting
accounts of the raid on the Chicago Black Panther headquarters that resulted in the death of
Panthers Fred Hampton and Matt Clark. See M. ARLEN, AN AMERICAN VERDICT 132-37

(1973). Police gave so many inconsistent reports of their announcement as to create the strong
suspicion that there was none. Moreover, even the police who claimed announcement was
made said they forced entry shortly after the occupants replied "Who's there" or "Just a minute." After the police forcibly entered the small house, gunfire ensued which killed Hampton
and Clark and wounded four other Panthers. One police officer was shot, by another officer.
A ballistics investigation recovered approximately ninety shots, only one of which was conclusively attributed to a Panther weapon.
102. See United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974).
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cupant to defend against a perceived burglary. 10 3
Announcement protection for business would also prevent destruction of property. Rather than suffer physical damages to private
premises, a person ordinarily ought to be allowed the opportunity to
admit the officer voluntarily. 1 4 The common law was preoccupied
with the preservation of the outer door. 10 5 Common law courts
deemed announcement necessary because "otherwise the consequences would be fatal: for it would leave the family within, naked
and exposed to theives and robbers."' 1 The case of forcible, unannounced entry also implicates strong property interests where business premises are involved. 10 7 Under certain circumstances the
chance of property loss may be greater where a business is involved.
In both business and residential premises, the door or window
through which police entered will have been destroyed. In both, the
natural protection against burglary will have been destroyed until
the door or window is replaced. Where commercial premises contain valuable goods, the chance that the absence of meaningful barriers to thieves will result in property loss is correspondingly
greater.108
The same principle for determining when entry offends privacy
interests also determines whether these policies apply; 0 9 that is,
when an occupant holds an expectation that intruders will not enter
premises unannounced, announcement policies come into play. The
gap between knowledge that an intrusion is occurring and the understanding that it is authorized creates a volatile tension between occupants and police. Doors may remain locked and consequently be
broken. The uncertainty may create dangerous circumstances and
the surprise entry may cause emotional trauma. Since these policies
are the touchstone for identifying premises that deserve announcement protection, police should be required to announce prior to entry of any premises to which this principle applies.110 Application of
103. Consider the barbershop involved in Francis. The shop undoubtedly contained valuable equipment and supplies, and possibly cash; see also Penn, There is This Store in Queens

That's Not the Best Place to Rob, Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1971, at 1, col. 4 (subhead "Felix Toro, a
Grocer, Defends His Profits By Killing Three, Wounding Four in 11 Months;" Toro had re-

ceived over 1500 letters from admirers before publication of the article).
104. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 4.8(a), at 125.

105. See Lee v. Gansel, 1 Cowp. 1, 6, 98 Eng. Rep. 935, 938 (K.B. 1774).
106. Lee v. Gansel, 1 Cowp. at 6, 98 Eng. Rep. at 938.
107. See United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 1974).

108. Although doors and locks were difficult to replace in seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury England, it is not clear why this interest is no longer generally cited as justifying announcement rules. It would seem to be a pressing problem, particularly where the police entry
was made for purposes of arresting the sole occupant. This would seem to be particularly true
of business premises located where their open, unattended condition could be readily
observed.
109. See notes 94-95 supra and accompanying text.
110. Some business premises, however, may experience such a great deal of ingress and
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this principle creates an effective parity in announcement protection
between residential and business premises, and yet permits differences in protection when the relevant facts so require. Such an inquiry offers a surer guide to the appropriate scope of announcement
protection than indiscriminate reliance on commercial activity as a
proxy for the diminished expectation of privacy.
Ill.

POLICE INTEREST IN UNANNOUNCED ENTRY

Police may, under certain circumstances, have an interest in effecting a search pursuant to an unannounced entry. Legitimate law
enforcement interests have given rise to exceptions to announcement
requirements even in the dwelling context. Thus, police are not required to announce if they are reasonably acting to prevent the destruction of evidence.'
Another exception to announcement
requirements, recognized at common law, eliminated the need for
announcement if the peril to officers or to others would be increased
a duty to
if announcement were made.' 12 Also, police are relieved of
13
anounce if announcement would be a "useless gesture."
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Francis114 found that these
exceptions should be read more broadly when business premises
rather than a home is involved.' 5 This might justify distinguishing
homes and businesses if a heightened police interest in unannounced6
entry of business premises overcame announcement policies."
Nothing suggests that a stronger police interest in unannounced enegress that there is not a reasonable expectation against unannounced entries. Consider the
example of a busy but private warehouse during working hours. Many employees and members of the general public are likely to enter the warehouse unannounced a large number of
times each day. It seems that this type of business should be exempted from announcement
requirements because unannounced police entry of such a warehouse is not likely to implicate
announcement policies. Unannounced police entry in this setting would cause no property
damage, occasion little shock or embarrassment to the occupants, and would not create a danger of retaliatory violence. This is because there is no gap between the time an occupant realizes that someone is entering the premises and his formulation of a belief that the person is
making an authorized visit. The "intruding" officer from the start will be regarded as simply
another unannounced visitor likely to be transacting legitimate business.
11. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 483-84 (1963); 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 4.8(e).
112. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 58 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Launock
v. Brown, 2 B. & Ald. 592, 594, 106 Eng. Rep. 482,483 (K.B. 1819)); 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note
6, § 4.8(e).
113. See 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 4.8(f), at 137.
114. 646 F.2d 251 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
115. 646 F.2d at 258.
116. Law enforcement interests have justified reduced protections against police searches
in the past. See, eg., United States v. Ross, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982) (the nature of an automobile
in transit justifies a warrantless intrusion so that police can prevent the transportation of contraband); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (strong regulatory interest in safety of mines
justifies their warrantless inspection); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (limited stop and
frisk without probable cause is justified solely "for the protection of the police officer").
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tries exists when business premises rather than dwellings are involved. It seems intuitive that police are just as interested in
executing their jobs successfully in either case. Police, when determining whether circumstances
exist that justify unannounced entry,
must make a judgment concerning, for example, whether they will
be imperiled as a consequence of announcement or whether evidence will be destroyed if notice is given. The Francis court, however, placed no conditions on the conclusion that police may put
more emphasis on their safety or purpose in making this judgment
whenever any business premise is involved. 1 7 Accordingly, the conclusion is nothing more than a license for police to impermissibly
subvert announcement values simply because business rather than
residential premises are involved. 118
CONCLUSION

In the simplest sense, announcement requirements are means to
ensure that authorized police intrusions on private premises are
achieved in as dignified and peaceful a manner as possible. "The
requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing
entry into a home is deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be
given grudging application."'1 9 Whether announcement is statutorily or constitutionally based, its underlying values suggest that principled application of announcement policy requires extension of
both rules to many business premises.

117. See G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 354 (1977) ("[Nlormal enforcement of the tax laws" does not justify different treatment "simply because [petitioner] is a

cororation."). Similarly, mere interest in normal law enforcement does not justify a homebusiness distinction in announcement cases.

118. Some premises may, by their character, suggest a police interest in unannounced entry. For example, announcement prior to entry of a gun shop might put a dangerous occupant
on guard and consequently imperil police officers. Therefore, an unannounced entry might
fall within an announcement exception. However, this is not due to the bare fact that a gun
shop is a business rather than a home. Police would be equally justified in making an unannounced entry of a home that contained a dangerous and known to be armed occupant.
119. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958).

